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Awards as compensation
Abstract
Awards are non-material, extrinsic compensation taking the form of orders, medals, decorations and
prizes. They have been widely used in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit
and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, they have so far not received much attention. This paper
develops empirically testable hypotheses, analysing the determinants of the supply of awards. The
hypotheses refer to the possibility of using awards, the effectiveness of awards, and the capacity to
maintain the scarcity value of awards. As the number of awards bestowed cannot (at least so far) be
measured adequately, empirical evidence is adduced by way of illustrative examples.
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I. Awards are Omnipresent
Awards in the form of orders, medals and decorations exist everywhere in society.
Governments and all manner of non-governmental organisations hand out awards in the civil
and military sectors, in academia, in culture, in the media and in religion, as well as in sports.
All around the world1, officers are highly decorated; sometimes their entire chests are covered
with orders and decorations. In the arts, in culture and in the media, prominent examples are
the Academy Awards (Oscars), the prizes handed out by the film festivals at Cannes, Venice
or Berlin, the Emmy Awards and Grammy Awards, the Booker Prize and the prix Goncourt in
literature, or the Pulitzer Prize. Art institutions, such as museums, bestow titles, such as
benefactor or patron, upon their supporters. In the field of sports, there are regular, often
yearly, competitions for the title Olympic Champion or World Champion. Athletes are given
the honour of being elected “Sports Personality of the Year” (by the BBC) and are admitted
into the Halls of Fame. The International Football Association bestowed upon Pelé (Edsen
Arantes do Nascimento) and Franz Beckenbauer the “FIFA Centennial Order of Merit” for
being the best footballers of the 20th century. Religious organisations, such as the Catholic
Church, award the titles Canon, Monsignore or Archbishop, and beatify and canonise
distinguished persons, which can be considered a post mortem award.
It might be thought that academia, as the place of rational discourse, would be an exception.
However, the opposite is true: academia has an elaborate and extensive system of awards.
Universities confer many titles, such as honorary doctor or honorary professor or senator.
Professional associations award an enormous number of medals, ranging from the Fields
Medal in mathematics to Nobel Prizes (Weinberg and Galenson 2005). Prestigious
fellowships exist in Academies of Science (e.g. Fellow of the Royal Society FRS, founded in
1660; Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, founded in 1780; Fellow of the
Royal Society of Edinburgh FRSE, founded, among others, by Adam Smith in 1783; or
Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia FASSA); and in associations such as
the Econometric Society (Hamermesh and Schmidt 2001). And then there is the flood of best
paper awards handed out at conferences and by journals (Coupé 2003).
                                                 
1 The only exception seems to be Switzerland, where the (central and cantonal) governments hand out no awards
whatsoever in the form of orders, medals or decorations. This applies to the military branch too (but the military
managed to be allowed to wear foreign decorations). The Irish do not hand out civil honours, but there are a
small number of medals for the personnel of military and emergency services (Phillips 2004: 59).
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Even more surprising is the widespread use of awards in the corporate sector of a market
economy where the only reward, after all, is supposed to be money. Firms commend their
employees for being “Salesperson of the Month” or “Employee of the Week”; there seems to
exist no limit to the ingenuity of inventing new awards. Most for-profit firms extensively use
awards as a form of compensation in addition to monetary benefits. Awards have a strong
signalling function. They serve as an indication of what kind of (extra-role) behaviour is
desired by the management above and beyond normal duties. Awards also serve a signalling
function for the recipients. They improve career opportunities and indicate superior talent and
motivation to outsiders. Awards may bring recipients material benefits in economic
interactions (Ball et al. 2001). Awards certainly represent more than just money and the
recipients experience them as a special form of social distinction, setting them apart from the
other employees. I argue that there are major differences between awards and monetary
compensation, which makes the separate analysis of awards worthwhile. At this point it
suffices to mention the following differences:
- The material costs of awards are quite low for the donor but the value may be very
high for the recipient. The costs mainly consist in the selection and presentation at a
special ceremony. A quite different type of cost is the decreased value of an award if it
is handed out too freely;
- Accepting an award establishes a special relationship, in which the recipient owes
(some measure of) loyalty to the donor. It is in the interest of the recipient to show this
loyalty or respect to the bestower because doing otherwise would reduce the value of
the reward received. The respective contract, however, is tacit, incomplete, and
difficult, or impossible, to enforce by the donor ex post;
- Awards work better as an incentive instrument than monetary payment, when the
recipient’s performance can be only vaguely determined;
- Awards are less likely to crowd out the recipients’ intrinsic motivation than monetary
compensation;
- Awards as such are not taxed, while monetary income is (but the money possibly
coming with awards is, or rather should be, taxed);
- Awards are discrete and discontinuous, while monetary income is continuous.
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The desire for social distinction which lies behind the demand for awards can be taken to be
innate to human beings. The firms bestowing awards organize special ceremonies to present
them, publish the occasion in their newsletter, and exhibit the awards in well-visible locations.
These facts create a tension between the employees’ desire for social distinction and their
effort to stay in a good relationship with their work colleagues. The tension is reflected in the
observation that when employees are asked whether they would like being honoured in a
social occasion when receiving the award regularly express that they prefer not to have one,
but, nevertheless, are greatly pleased when their superiors organize such an event2.
The awards mentioned have, of course, many different properties. For some purposes, it is
necessary to carefully distinguish between, for instance, a (British) Lord and a Knight, as the
former brings legislative power (he or she becomes a member of the House of Lords) while
the latter is purely honorific. And it is certainly not the same gaining huge recognition and
publicity through winning the Nobel Prize as a sign of scientific achievement or, say,
receiving the little known Balzan Prize (though the latter comes with more money, roughly
one million Swiss Francs, or US$ 770,000). Awards bestowed within private institutions
including for-profit firms differ from other awards mainly that the money going with them is
of greater importance. But superiors nevertheless use them to give special recognition to
chosen employees going above and beyond pure material compensation. Awards thus are not
just a substitute for money but have special features. Huberman, Loch and Önüler (2004)
show experimentally that people value status independently of any monetary consequence and
are indeed willing to incur material costs to obtain it.
It is characteristic of awards that they can only be broadly defined. In this paper, awards are
cover extrinsic, but non-material compensation. Some awards such as the title “Manager of
the Month” are not intended to compensate recipients for their achievements; they are
therefore excluded from consideration in this paper. Awards differ from material, in particular
monetary, compensation, and also from purely intrinsic rewards (see Frey 1997, Bénabou and
Tirole 2004). The broad nature of awards is no mere accident, but an important feature of
awards. An analysis is difficult because the quality aspect is essential. It makes little sense, for
example, to just count the number of orders given out, because they differ in many respects,
most importantly in the appreciation accorded to them. Thus, there is a world of difference
                                                 
2 Personal communication of a manager of a prominent American high-tech firm located in Switzerland.
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between a person receiving the Most Noble Order of the Garter created in 1348, or an MBE
(Member of the Order of the British Empire) created in 1917. At the present state of research,
it is not possible to evaluate the number and quality of awards using any one single measure.
Moreover, there are serious data limitations. To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive list
of the different types and classes of awards in the various spheres of society (government, the
arts, culture, the media, sports, religion, academia, not-for-profit and for-profit enterprises),
countries and time periods. A statistic of awards handed out in each category, and for each
country and time period is even more elusive. Only partial, spotty and inconsistent evidence is
available from scattered sources. This applies, in particular, to the many awards given by
private institutions, such as non-profit organisations, clubs and firms. Orders given by
monarchs or governments are somewhat better documented3. Because no internationally
comparable data on awards are available, the propositions outlined below are illustrated with
examples. They serve to make the presentation more vivid but they are not meant to substitute
for a rigorous quantitative test.
The science of phaleristics (the Greek and Roman word for award) has produced a large
literature on specific awards, in particular on orders, decorations and medals. This literature is
historically oriented and mainly devoted to presenting legal rules and regulations, as well as
facts. Examples are Risk (1972) on the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, or Galloway
(2002) on the Order of St Michael and St George. Very useful discussions (including some
data) on the present state of orders, focusing on Britain, are provided by Phillips (2004) and in
the report by the House of Commons (2004). Only a few works cover orders across several
countries, for instance Klietmann (1984), Honig (1986), and Mericka and Marco (1990).
There is a considerable literature on awards in sociology. Examples are Bourdieu (1979),
Goodin (1980), Elster (1983), Braudy (1986), Walzer (1983) or Baurmann (2002). Of special
relevance are the works on status, see e.g. Marmot (2004) and de Botton (2004). With few
exceptions, these works address awards and distinctions in general, but do not look at awards
as a form of compensation and do not use a comparative perspective. There is a small
literature in administrative science devoted to public service awards in particular countries
(e.g. Borins 1999; 2000).
                                                 
3 A useful source is the article “List of Prizes, Medals and Awards” in wikipedia ( http://en.wikipedia.org) and
Medals of the World by Megan C. Robertson (www.medals.org.uk). Phillips (2004) and the House of Commons
(2004) give a useful survey of (part of) the orders in Britain, as well as some limited information about other
countries, according to the present situation.
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Awards have been analysed in economics particularly in the context of incentives (e.g.
Prendergast 1999), in particular non-monetary ones (Camerer 1988, Ward and Sloane 2000,
Prendergast and Stole 2001, Jeffrey 2004). Ginsburgh and van Ours (2003), Ginsburgh
(2003), and Ginsburgh and Weyers (2005)  discuss Academy Awards (Oscars) in film, the
Booker Prize in literature, and the Eurovision Song Contest. Glejser, and Heyndels (2003)
deal with one of the most important piano competitions, the International Queen Elisabeth
Prize.
The goal of this paper is to analyse awards as a special form of compensation. This helps us to
better understand the important role awards play in society and in particular organizations.
The supply of awards depends on three sets of determinants. Firstly, there are the possibilities
available to the principal. Compared to financial compensation, more awards are offered,
(1) When the principal has little financial resources; and
(2) When it is difficult to ex ante formulate and monitor work effort.
Secondly, the principal’s actions depend on the effectiveness of awards as incentive
mechanisms compared to other instruments. Compared to financial rewards, awards are used
less,
(3) When the principal is able to control the supply of awards;
(4) When the positional externality produced by a particular award is high; and
(5) When awards are likely to crowd out intrinsic motivation.
Finally, in order to present a valid alternative to material (financial) compensation, awards
must have scarcity value for the recipients. The value of awards will be the higher,
(6) When the risk of giving awards to unworthy persons is smaller;
(7) When fewer persons refuse awards; and
(8) When the principal’s time horizon is longer, i.e. when the probability of staying in
power is greater.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section II discusses when and why people like to receive
awards. Section III analyses the conditions under which awards are supplied. A principal-
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agent setting with incomplete contracts is used to highlight particular features of awards. The
various theoretical propositions are illustrated by examples. Section IV concludes.
II. WHEN ARE AWARDS VALUED?
Individuals are taken to have an innate desire to distinguish themselves from other
individuals. People have a strong urge to be better than others. What matters to people is the
relative, and not the absolute, ranking (Frank 1985). The quest for social distinction is
assumed to be a hard-wired trait of human nature.  This assumption is in line with the socio-
biological and evolutionary literature; see e.g. Henrich and Gil-White (2001) or Zizzo (2002).
It follows that awards are valued most highly by prospective and actual recipients when they
establish a social distinction not achievable by other means4. In the context of firms, awards
are therefore particularly highly valued when for some reason such distinction cannot be
reached through monetary compensation. This may occur under various circumstances:
(1) The monetary compensation received by other employees is not, or at least not well,
known. This is the case in most European firms (but less so in the United States);
(2) The extent of fringe benefits, say the use of the jet, fancy cars and hotels, or vacation
homes offered by the firm to particular employees is not well known or not feasable;
(3) The firm is committed to small differences in salary. While this condition is of lesser
importance in classical for-profit firms, it does play a significant role in many not-for-
profits, in cooperatives and also in owner-managed firms. In these types of firms
awards are a welcome additional compensation instrument.
An award is also the more valuable to a recipient, the higher the recognition enjoyed by the
award giving body. An award bestowed by an institution of high prestige and legitimacy is
valued more highly than one bestowed by a body which is little known and not highly
appreciated. When the award giving institution has a bad reputation, an award is a cost, rather
than a benefit to the recipient (and is therefore normally rejected).
                                                 
4 The demand for awards is more fully discussed in Frey (2005) and Frey and Neckermann (2006). See also
Hansen and Weisbrod (1972) and the unpublished notes by Besley (2005).
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III. WHEN ARE AWARDS USED?
The institution (or person) bestowing an award can be taken to be a principal maximizing
utility by inducing the agents, as the recipients of the awards, to act in the principal’s
interests. The principal-agent relationship between the donor and recipient of awards involves
a tacit and incomplete contract. The terms of the award contract are not precisely specified,
and are often left deliberately vague. The recipient exhibits some measure of loyalty to the
award giver. The higher the value of an award, the higher the recognition and legitimacy
enjoyed by the award giving body, and, therefore, recipients have an incentive to bolster the
donor’s prestige. The award received would be devalued if the recipients criticized the donor
unfairly or excessively. Rather, they benefit from speaking in favourable terms, and acting in
support of, the award giving institution. An example is the Nobel Prize Committee who
makes great efforts to ensure that the recipient of a Prize does deserve it. The committee
consults extensively with the scientific community. It even checks whether a scholar can be
expected to behave in an appropriate manner at the award ceremony, where the Swedish King
bestows the Prize (see e.g. Nasar 1998 for the case of John Nash).
Other members of society clearly recognize this psychological bond established by accepting
an award. A recipient who later turns against the bestowing institution faces disapproval by
other members of society who argue or at least believe that the particular person should not
have accepted the award in the first place if he or she does not side with the bestowing
institution. The psychological contract (Rousseau and MacLean Parks 1993, Rousseau 1995)
between the donor and recipient of an award differs significantly from a trade contract in a
market, in which an agent is promised payment by the principal for a well-defined
performance (for instance for delivering a good). If the principal accepts the performance as
satisfactory, the agent receives the payment and is then free of any further obligation. In
particular, such a monetary exchange does not establish any special bond; the agent is
perfectly free to offer the goods to any prospective buyer. An employment contract also
differs from an award contract. In an employment contract, performance is often explicitly
and precisely specified, and monetary compensation is paid after the service has been
rendered. Once the employment contract is fulfilled, the employee is free to offer the services
elsewhere. But such contracts mainly apply to simple tasks. Employment contracts for more
qualified tasks share some of the features of award contracts. The tasks to be performed are
incompletely specified, and can be only partially monitored and enforced by the principal. In
that case, the agent is expected to exhibit loyalty towards the principal. However, in contrast
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to award contracts, once the employment relationship has ended, no further loyalty is owed5.
Managers can therefore be observed switching freely from one firm to another, or soccer
players transferring (with the approval of their present club) to an archrival. While a person
may receive awards from other donors (e.g. an order from a monarch of another country), this
in no way ends the obligation to maintain loyalty to the previous donor.
A.  Possibilities of Using Awards as Incentives
Institutions short of income often turn to awards in order to provide incentives to their agents.
Awards are extremely inexpensive in monetary terms. Sometimes awards simply consist in a
piece of ribbon. In many cases, the recipients must even pay for the insignia of the order
bestowed upon them. For the donor the only material costs involved consist in the
organization of the actual ceremony where the award is presented. These costs are, in general,
quite low. The low costs make awards particularly attractive to donors short of funds.
The more strongly an institution is restrained by a lack of income, the more  it turns to awards
rather than to money to provide incentives.The role of income constraints on the supply of
awards applies in particular to three institutions. Monarchies were strongly income restrained
in the past, and today often have no independent source of income. They, therefore, tend to
turn to awards more than republics benefiting from tax revenue do. The more income-
constrained dictatorships in poor countries are, the more they use awards as incentive
instruments. Not-for-profit firms are often very income-constrained and, therefore, use awards
more frequently than for-profit firms.
Recent research on incentive systems and corporate governance (see the surveys by Daily,
Dalton and Canella 2003, Prendergast 1999) suggests that monetary compensation does not
always work well. This holds, in particular, when the task to be performed is difficult, or
impossible, to specify ex ante, or to monitor ex post. In this case, it is hard to make a
monetary payment which is considered to be fair by the recipients. “Soft” awards (e.g.
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 1994), which endeavour to take a broader view of the agent’s
efforts, become more useful then. Such awards are well suited to that purpose. With a few
                                                 
5 An exception is when the employee has acquired firm-specific secrets.
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exceptions in the military branch6, orders, decorations and prizes are given to honour more
general efforts, rather than very specific efforts.
When it is more difficult to formulate specific contracts ex ante, and to monitor ex post,
awards function more efficiently as incentives, compared to monetary compensation.
This difficulty is reflected by how the Nobel Prize is awarded. According to Nobel’s
testament, the prize should be given every year to those scientists who made the most
important contribution to science during the previous year. The fact that the Nobel Prize is
awarded, in the overwhelming majority of cases, on the basis of a scholar’s overall life
performance, suggests that prizes serve this purpose well. On the other hand, one rarely
observes a person being given a sum of money for his or her life achievement. If it were done,
the question would immediately arise why the sum is not higher or lower. An evaluation in
euros and cents of what one has achieved, and how one has performed in life, is difficult, to
say the least, and many would consider it offensive to have their life evaluated in these terms.
The same question also arises with respect to awards, but it is less harmful, exactly because
the value of awards is purposely left vague. Moreover it is precisely this property that makes
awards so efficient in compensating people for outstanding achievements.
There are parts of society in which specific tasks are difficult, or impossible, to define ex ante,
and to monitor ex post, and where an overall evaluation of effort is more efficient. Provided
suitable data will be available in the future, the importance of awards can be evaluated by
looking at the lower monetary compensation in sectors and occupations with more awards,
compared to those with fewer awards (compensating variation).
Decorations are both extremely important and abundant in the military7, as the specific tasks
to be performed, especially during combat, are largely unpredictable and cannot be contracted
ex ante. The United States, for instance, knows only three civilian state awards, but offers
about 170 different military decorations (of which over 60 are currently in use), such as the
Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver
and Bronze Star, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Soldier’s Medal, the
                                                 
6 Some orders, such as the Victoria Cross, are given for specific acts of valour, but most military decorations are
not. The United States, by 1969, had given awards of valour, such as the Purple Heart, to 56 generals who
served in Vietnam, although only one general died from enemy fire at that time (Cowen 2000: 93).
7 The fact that the Swiss army is the only exception can be attributed to the fact that it consists almost entirely of
conscripted citizens, and has not been involved in war for two hundred years.
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Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal, the Army Commendation, the Purple Heart
(Robertson 2005).
For the public sector, it is expected that more awards are handed out, as it tends to be more
difficult to formulate an efficient ex-ante contract than is the case in the market sector. The
report of the House of Commons (2004: 3) refers to “the special generosity to state servants
stemming from the relative modesty of public sector salaries when compared to the private
sector”. In recent years, salary levels have improved substantially, and, at the same time, “the
long term trend was clearly away from the state sector”. Yet, civil servants still receive
“favourable treatment” (House of Commons 2004: 3-4). Fifty years ago, roughly 40 percent
of all British state awards went to public servants, while today’s percentage is below 14
percent.
B. Effectiveness as Compensation Instrument
Awards only serve as an effective instrument of compensation if the prospective recipients
value them. The principal must therefore be able to control the supply process. For this
reason, the institution must be able to credibly restrict the number. Institutions with a long
history and high stability find it easier to establish and observe such self-constraints.
Moreover, other principals must be prevented from handing out the same, or similar awards.
Proposition 1. The more the principals are able to control the supply of awards, the more
effective are awards as incentive instruments.
Self-imposed restrictions that control the number of awards handed out serve as a means to
maintain their quality. In contrast, when several institutions are able to hand out similar
awards, a typical public good situation arises. A particular principal only takes into account
the costs incurred of providing the awards, but not the costs of diminishing the quality of the
rewards falling upon all principals handing out awards. But he is also burdened by the costs
imposed by other principals handing out awards. Each prefers to act as a free-rider, in the
sense that there is too low an incentive to keep the number of awards down, and therewith
keep their quality up.
A principal faced with no or only a few competing award givers, therefore, can more easily
maintain the quality than a principal who has to act in a system with many award givers.
Proposition 1 suggests that political decentralisation increases the supply of awards compared
to the supply in a fully centralized country. It follows that the value (price) of awards is lower
12
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in a decentralized than in a centralised polity. The hundreds of principalities existing in
Germany before the foundation of the German Reich had distributed a large number of orders
many of which were of low value. The same holds for Italy before the Risorgimento. The
resulting inflation of orders reduced their value.
Military decorations are also handed out more liberally when there is no strong central
command, but the various branches of the military are in competition with each other and can
to some extent act on their own. In tandem with this expansion of different types of awards,
the number of awards bestowed also increases greatly. The gradual emergence of competing
branches in the armed forces of the United States is consistent with the large increase in the
bestowment of the most prestigious military decoration, the Purple Heart8. In the
Revolutionary War, there existed only one Military Force under General Washington’s
command. The Purple Heart was only awarded three times. In contrast, during WWII in one
battle alone, at Iwo Jima, the U.S. suffered 28,686 casualties (of which 6,821 died), each of
which received a Purple Heart (Cowen 2000: 93). Today, the American forces are composed
of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and more recently also of the Marines and the Coast
Guard, each one having its own command, with a good measure of independence. The highest
award of the US military, the Medal of Honor, was originally issued to members of the US
Army. In 1947, the US Air Force began issuing its own version of the Medal of Honor,
followed later by the US Navy and the Marines. There is also a US Coast Guard version.
 The British monarchy has been successful in imposing restrictions on the number of titles
conferred in some of the orders. One of the reasons the Most Noble Order of the Garter and
the Most Ancient and Noble Order of the Thistle (which are bestowed personally by the
Sovereign) are held in such high esteem, is that the number of Knights/Ladies is restricted to
25 and 16 respectively (Phillips 2004). The highest British order, the Victorian Cross, has
only been bestowed 1,354 times since its establishment 150 years ago. In contrast, the Italian
Republic, which has a similar population as the UK, hands out state awards very liberally.
The Order of Work has no fewer than 850,000 living members, and each year a further 20,000
are added. The French Republic has maximum limits on the five ranks of its légion
d’honneur, but in fact greatly exceeds the limits9.
                                                 
8 Needless to say, there are many other explanations possible.
9 For instance, the number of Commanders is restricted to 1250, but there are actually 3626; the respective
numbers for Officers are 10,000 and 22,401 (wikipedia, article on légion d’honneur).
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These observations are consistent with Proposition 1. The British monarchy is time-honoured
and very stable, whereas the Italian and French governments count as two of the most highly
unstable governments in Europe. Consistent with our analysis, orders and titles in Britain
have been able to retain much of their esteem (see Phillips 2004), while this is clearly less so
in Italy and France.
Another determinant of the value of an award is that the award is kept scarce. When awards
are bestowed in large numbers to persons of low distinction, they are certainly accorded less
prestige than those awards that are bestowed only in rare instances and only to a few persons
of high standing.
The more an award is conceived as a pure positional good (Frank 1985, Frank and Cook
1995, De Botton 2004, Marmot 2004), the higher is the utility to the recipient, but the more
strongly it is counterbalanced by the utility loss of those not receiving it. In the aggregate, the
incentive effect may even be counterproductive. Awards may have not only a positive
incentive effect on the persons receiving them, or hoping to receive them, but may also have a
negative external effect on the persons who are disappointed or angry at not having received
them. This aspect was clearly expressed by Winston Churchill in a House of Commons
speech on 22 August 1944: “A medal glitters, but it also casts a shadow. The task of drawing
up regulations for such awards is one which does not admit of a perfect solution. It is not
possible to satisfy everybody without running the risk of satisfying nobody. All that is
possible is to give the greatest satisfaction to the greatest number and to hurt the feelings of
the fewest” (House of Commons 2004:1).
Proposition 2. The greater the positional externalities produced by an award, the less
productive it is in the aggregate as an incentive instrument and the more rarely it will be used.
Award givers are aware of this effect and react to it. One possibility to mitigate the negative
external effects on non-recipients is to introduce marginal changes in the system. When
people have the possibility of slowly climbing up a social ladder of classes of an award, or if
the recipient must have a minimum age, outsiders are less inclined to perceive the award in
terms of a positional good, and suffer a smaller negative external effect. The Order of Merit
of the Italian Republic does this by requiring a minimum age of 35 years and by not allowing
people to jump grades; recipients must work their way up from Cavaliere, Ufficiale,
Commendatore, Grande Ufficiale, Cavaliere di Gran Croce to Cavaliere di Gran Croce
decorato di Gran Cordone.
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There is another external effect award givers have to take into account. The recipients
themselves may under-perform after getting an award due to a “distraction” and “extraction”
effect. An empirical study (Malmendier and Tate 2005) of US CEOs with “superstar” status,
i.e. those who were appointed “Best Managers” by Business Week, indicates that there is a
decline in performance following the receipt of the CEO award. Stock market performance
and accounting profits of the corporations of the respective managers tend to fall. One reason
is that the CEOs start writing books and sitting on more boards of other firms. Another is that
they extract much higher rents from their company and exert more control over their earnings.
Monetary compensation has been shown to crowd-out intrinsic motivation under specific
circumstances, i.e. when the agents are perceived to be controlling (e.g. Frey 1997, Osterloh
and Frey 2000, Frey and Jegen 2001, Bénabou and Tirole 2004). This motivation crowding
effect may overcompensate the relative price effect of the monetary incentive. The larger this
perverse effect of monetary compensation is, the more important intrinsic motivation becomes
for a task or sector. When an award is received, most persons take it as a gesture of support,
rather than of control, and it is therefore likely to have a positive, rather than a negative, effect
on performance.
Proposition 3. In sectors and activities where intrinsic motivation is important, and is likely to
be crowded-out by monetary compensation, awards are relatively more efficient.
Intrinsic motivation is of particular importance in the volunteering and humanitarian sectors,
academia, the arts, the military, and certain sectors of public services (Frey 1997). The list on
awards compiled by Robertson (www.medals.org.uk) documents that awards do indeed play a
major role as an incentive instrument in these sectors. Examples can be found in the many
countries bestowing awards for voluntary work in the Red Cross, in the Fire Brigade or in the
Lifeguard.
C.  Maintaining the Value of Awards
The quality of an award depends on its rarity. This has been clearly expressed by Winston
Churchill in a speech in the House of Commons, 22 August 1944: “... a distinction is
something which everybody does not possess. If all have it, it is of less value” (House of
Commons 2004:1). The award-giving institution therefore has a strong interest in maintaining
the quality of the awards. They must take measures to guard the award against a decline in
quality due to bestowing them to the wrong persons.
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Proposition 4. The more a donor can ensure that awards go only to deserving persons, the
more its value is maintained.
The Catholic Church has an elaborate system to ensure that only those persons are beatified
and sanctified who, according to their carefully formulated standards, deserve it. It has used
an ingenuous institution for that purpose, the advocatus diaboli. This person is officially
given the task of finding potentially harmful aspects in the life of people proposed as beati or
sancti. Accordingly, one rightly speaks of a “process”, in which both the positive and the
negative sides are represented. The Church is well aware that its reputation would suffer
badly if a (recently appointed) saint would turn out to be unworthy. But, due to its long-
standing experience and history, it has managed admirably, and saints are venerated by a huge
number of church-members and non-church members alike. Mother Teresa having been
canonised is a good example10.
A relatively safe way to avoid giving honours to unworthy persons is to give them only after
they have proved loyal to the donor. For that reason it can be observed that orders – where the
issue of loyalty is most important – are predominantly given at an advanced age (for Britain,
see the extensive documentation in the House of Commons 2004, Phillips 2004). Where
loyalty is of lesser importance, and present work effort matters more, awards are given to
younger people. Examples are the American John Bates Clark Medal or the German
Leibnizpreis. These observations are consistent with proposition 4.
The quality of an award suffers when the donor bestows it, but the person chosen does not
accept it. As a result, the award becomes less effective as an incentive instrument. The
damage to the award’s reputation is the greater, the more widely known the refusal becomes.
The damage to the donor’s reputation and to the award’s reputation is greater still if recipients
turn out to be unworthy.
Proposition 5: The quality of an award is the better maintained, the lower the probability that
the award is publicly refused.
Institutions handing out rewards can be seen to make great efforts to ensure that the persons
chosen will accept the awards. Refusal of an award reduces the prestige of the award giving
body. This is demonstrated by the British system of bestowing orders. After having been
                                                 
10 Pope John Paul II changed the rules. There is no longer an advocatus diaboli, but the task is given to a
commission. This can be expected to greatly affect the procedure, and may well harm the Church’s reputation by
leading to more errors.
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chosen by carefully selected committees, and after having been scrutinised by the Ceremonial
Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, the prospective recipients are asked whether they will accept
the honour. Only if they formally agree is the list put forward to the Queen and then officially
published in the London Gazette (House of Commons 2004). 98 percent of those offered an
award accept it, and the majority of the 2 percent who decline do so for private reasons
(Phillips 2004: 5). This procedure ensures that a refusal is not made public, except when a
leak occurs. In Britain, orders and medals enjoy high prestige and respect and receive solid
public support (House of Commons 2004:3). This is consistent with the care that is taken to
avoid refusals (Phillips 2004: 5).
The Nobel Prize Committee is more restricted in this respect. As the conferral is kept secret,
the prospective recipients cannot be asked whether they will accept. The Committee must
make its own inquiries, and carefully deliberate the risk of refusal. Nevertheless, it sometimes
happens, the best-known example being Jean Paul Sartre’s refusal of the Nobel Prize in
Literature. This particular Nobel Prize is indeed more controversial, and is generally less
valued, than the Nobel Prizes in the Sciences where few, if any, refusals are known. These
observations are consistent with proposition 5.
The shorter the time horizon of the principals, the more they rely on awards, because the
costs, in the form of award inflation, will only occur in the future.
Proposition 6. The lower the probability of remaining in power (in a democracy, the lower
the re-election probability), the larger the number of awards supplied.
Before his resignation in 1976, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson did great harm to
the honours system by handing out far too many awards to Labour supporters (which was
heavily criticised, see De-la-Noy 1985:141). When a regime fears for its survival, the time
horizon is short and there is a great incentive to try to forestall this fate by using awards as
incentives to supporters. Examples are the German Iron Cross, established in 1813, and
highly esteemed up until the 20th century. But it lost much of its lustre when it was given out
to 5,400,000 soldiers in WWI, in which 13.2 million German soldiers were engaged, i.e. on
average, 40 percent of all soldiers received an Iron Cross. As some soldiers received several
Iron Crosses of different grades, historians estimate that about 20 percent of the German
soldiers were decorated in this way. Similarly, in WWII, 5,000,000 Iron Crosses were
awarded by the Wehrmacht (Kellerhoff 2004). In both Wars, the Germans were on the losing
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side. The war leaders were, quite early on11, aware of the fact that their chances of winning
the war were small and ever diminishing.
The same policy can be observed when the principal has a short-term time horizon due to bad
health. Pope John Paul II, who had been in bad health for a number of years, and whose
imminent death was often an issue, greatly increased the number of canonisations. He
beatified and sanctified many more people than all the other popes of all centuries combined
(Cowen 2000:94). Over the 26 years of his pontificate (1978-2005), John Paul II recognised
488 saints and beatified 1,338 persons, putting them on the path to sainthood. The press
commented “... as with everything, inflation produces devaluation” (Hennerberger 2002).
IV.  Concluding Remarks
Awards form an important part of the compensation system in a society. In many respects,
they deviate systematically from extrinsic incentives in monetary or material form, as well as
from intrinsic incentives. Awards constitute a type of non-material extrinsic reward,
extensively used in all spheres of society, including the economy.
The supply side has been analysed in the context of a principal-agent relationship between the
award donor and the award recipient, involving a tacit and incomplete contract. The terms of
the award contract are not precisely defined, and are often left rather vague. Awards turn out
to be suitable instruments to elicit the work effort and support desired by the award donor.
The propositions are, on the whole, consistent with the way awards are handed out. Awards as
instruments of compensation are proposed to be more efficient, and to be used more
extensively,
- The smaller the principal’s financial resources are;
- The more difficult it is to ex ante formulate and monitor work effort;
- The less the principal is able to control the number of awards handed out;
- The less awards have the character of positional goods;
- The smaller the likelihood of crowding out intrinsic motivation;
                                                 
11 Empirical evidence for World War II is provided in Frey and Kucher (2000).
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- The smaller the risk of giving out awards to unworthy persons;
- The fewer persons refuse awards; and
- The shorter the principal expects to stay in power.
The unavailability of reliable and consistent data on awards prohibits the use of econometric
techniques to test these propositions. For that reason, the propositions have been illustrated by
examples.
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